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In this MBA project, we examine the Air Force and Army Financial Management 
operations in the contingency environment.  The project will examine transformational 
ways of comptroller operations.  This project will give a brief history and lessons learned 
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A. MBA PROJECT 
The basic argument of Military Money, A Fiscal History of the U.S. Army 
Overseas in World War II by Walter Rundell, Jr. is “that the leadership of the Finance 
Department, being unprepared for World War II, approached many of its responsibilities 
unsystematically and without much conceptualization of the kinds of situations it would 
face.”1  Mr. Rundell highlights many of the flawed aspects of the combat finance 
operations focusing on organizational structure, planning and leadership.  This project 
will ask, have we learned from our mistakes over the last 60 years?  If not, what 
recommendations would improve comptroller performance during contingency 
operations. 
Chapter II provides a history of, and lessons learned, from combat comptrollers 
from World War II to the present.  It highlights many of the problems incurred by combat 
comptrollers and their solutions.  It is also the foundations for many of the 
recommendations provided in Chapter V.  Chapters III and IV will discuss the U.S. Army 
and U.S. Air Force concept of operations, respectfully.  They define how financial and 
resource management personnel are presented to the combatant commander.  Training is 
highlighted to guarantee a capable force to the combatant commander.  Lastly, the current 
contingency concept of operations is presented.  These chapters are important because 
they highlight the difference between services in organization and employment of forces.  
Strength and weaknesses discussed in these chapters also play a large role in the 
recommendations in Chapter V.  This is becoming more important with increased 
individual augmentation, which is discussed later in this chapter.  The organization and 
employment of forces are the rationale for some of the recommendations.  Chapter V 
discusses the recommendations and provides analysis on the rationale behind the 
recommendations. 
The recommendations are based on lessons learned and the overall effectiveness 
of the two services in contingencies.  These recommendations are in accordance with the 
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Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Military Strategy.  The recommendations 
will cover the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels of planning.  The 
recommendations cross the planning spectrum and include recommendations in areas like 
Mobilization, Unity of Command and Effort, Benchmarking Finance Command and 
Theater Finance Cell, One Installation One Commander, Central Processing, Manual 
Operations, and Modularity.  Leadership is integral to all of these recommendations.  
Without effective leadership at the National Command Authority and throughout the 
military chain of command, none of the recommendations can be accomplished.  The 
continued “Long War” makes this project very imperative.    
B. IMPORTANCE 
Defeating adaptive adversaries requires flexible, modular and deployable joint 
forces with the ability to combine the strengths of individual Services, Combatant 
commands, and other Government agencies.2  The Department of Defense and especially 
the financial management career field, needs to improve its ability to plan, resource and 
field joint capabilities, ensuring that the best solutions are brought forward and 
implemented.   
Today, the Army and Air Force must increase their interoperability, effectiveness 
and efficiency with the limited resources available.  Individual Augmentation is a driving 
force behind this need.  Individual Augmentation is used when one service is unable to 
fill all assigned requirements for a contingency.  Other services will provide personnel to 
meet the combatant commander’s request for forces.  The manpower requirements are in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Horn of Africa, and other areas around the world.  Currently, 
Individual Augmentees assigned to joint headquarters positions account for nearly half of 
the Air Force officer deployment requirements.  This project’s research and 
recommendations will highlight the need for interoperability.  
C. RESEARCH METHOD 
A detailed literature review was conducted to determine if we have learned from 
our mistakes over the last 60 years and if not, what recommendations would improve 
comptroller performance during contingency operations.  We also interviewed several 
personnel with vast finance experience across different levels of command.  Mr. 
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Rundell’s book formed the hypothesis for the project.  Several prior theses’ from the U.S. 
Army War College and U.S. Army Command and Staff College were very useful with 
historical evidence on Vietnam and OPERATION DESERT STORM as well as previous 
recommendations like centralized command and control.  Articles written for the Armed 
Forces Comptroller Magazine and the Air Force Comptroller Magazine also highlighted 
the mobilization, and command and control issues.  Army Field Manuals and Air Force 
Instructions guided the current concept of operations.  Government Accountability Office 
reports and other literary articles provided additional sources of information on spending, 
accountability, and Defense Finance and Accounting Service.  These sources laid the 
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II. HISTORY OF COMBAT COMPTROLLERS 
To carry on war, three things are necessary:  money, money, and yet more 
money. 
    —Gian Jacopo Trivulzio to Louis XII of France 14993 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
Financial management and comptroller strategy during contingency operations 
have been plagued by continuing issues learned and relearned since World War II.  When 
developing strategy, there are three basic sources of practical advice; historical 
experience, prudence, and common sense.  We can educate our common sense without 
reading history.4  However, we cannot develop effective strategy without reading and 
learning from our history.  Comptroller personnel must read our combat history, learn 
from it, and adapt our policy, procedures, training and tactics to reflect those lessons.    
The Pacific and European theaters in World War II had different weaknesses.  
They were concepts of operations and differences in command and control.  Proper 
planning by leadership could have been mitigated many of these weaknesses.  Leadership 
was the main factor in most cases.  Mr. Rundell states, “The lack of wartime experience 
might have been the dominant cause for the insufficient preparation.  More likely was a 
lack of foresight on the part of finance leadership.”5  
B.  BASIC PROBLEMS 
There are three basic concerns with financial services in foreign areas:  
leadership, planning and organizational structure. 
1. Leadership 
During WWII, there was considerable pressure from commanding officers to buy 
things that were inappropriate or illegal.  A disbursing officer assigned to the Melbourne, 
Australia Finance Office stopped commercial payments because they exceeded his 
authorization.  General Douglas MacArthur thought there should be no hesitancy in 
payments.  The disbursing officer, as the accountable official, told General MacArthur he 
was aware of the facts and that he was obliged to follow Army regulations and that he 
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would be liable for the questionable payments.6  The same pressures can be revealed 
today in OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDON (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDON (OIF). 
According to a telephone interview with resource managers at 3rd Army earlier 
this year, there were many discrepancies in the management of resources by operational 
commanders.  The commanders were purchasing duplicative televisions, generators, and 
other items leading to a 3rd Army discovery that items purchased with theater funds were 
redeployed to home station.  These items were to be transferred to the replacing unit, 
once in theater.  Other questionable purchases included having Kellogg Brown and Root 
refurbish tactical operation centers, dining facilities, billeting and latrines after each new 
rotation.  Some commanders would even circumvent the supply and maintenance system 
by having mechanics purchase new Abrams M1 battle tank engines, rather than 
rebuilding engines on a regular maintenance schedule.  They did this because their own 
Operations and Maintenance accounts did not have enough unit funding to buy new 
engines.7 
Colonel Dunaway, former US Central Command Comptroller and Air Combat 
Command Financial Management Deputy, highlighted “numerous occasions” of 
inappropriate purchases and indicated that some of the deployed locations did not take 
fiscal responsibility to heart.8  One location had televisions and VCRs in every billeting 
room as well as in the recreation rooms, while another location leased vehicles far 
exceeding the requirement of the base.  Although these purchases are not illegal, the 
perception was one of wasteful spending.  Other items included Sumo Wrestling Suites, 
Cappuccino Machines, and other non-essential items.9  To help prevent further excesses, 
U.S. Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) hosts a conference for all commanders 
that will be entering their area of operation where they highlight the need for 
commanders to be fiscally responsible and remind them of the perceptions associated 
with the purchases.  Most are receptive. 
Other leadership challenges were experience and motivation.  A quick look at 
many of the biographies of senior leadership in the Air Force at 9/11 would substantiate a 
lack of experience in the deployed environment.  Some have never been a commander or 
had an operational tour prior to 9/11.  Then Captain Tony Hernandez, SAF/FM 
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Warplanner, states that “Air Staff” did not place a high priority, nor did the major 
commands, on planning and the war effort.10  He was unfortunately, the least ranking 
officer in a rank conscious environment.  Colonel Dan Dunaway, former Air Combat 
Command Financial Management Deputy, highlighted the operational failure of financial 
management leadership at CENTAF, when he said that there was a “leadership challenge 
and lack of initiative” and that the comptroller was “completely disengaged.”11  Many of 
the CENTAF financial management personnel would agree.  To highlight this fact, as the 
A-8, this individual was the only major staff head not to move forward with General 
Moseley for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.12  Leadership is essential for proper 
planning. 
2. Planning 
Planning is to be performed at every step of command, and is conducted across 
the spectrum of military operations.  Figure 9 provides a guide to the many situations that 
exist across the planning continuum.  Figure 10 highlights the scope of planning that is to 
be accomplished.  There are numerous examples from the tactical to the strategic level of 
the lack of planning from World War II to the present.  Many of the same wartime fiscal 
problems experienced in World War II extended into the immediate European 
reconstruction period.13  Textbook efficiency that is generally planned for is not possible 
under contingency operations.  However, with proper planning and leadership, financial 
problems could have been mitigated or controlled. 
 
 





Figure 2.   Scope of Joint Operations Planning (Source:  Joint Publication 5-0) 
    
The first step of planning is mobilization.  Mobilization of forces was a dire 
problem in WW II.  “Soon after the war began, it became apparent that there had been a 
serious omission in mobilization planning in the Finance Department. No one had 
foreseen the need for finance service.”14  “Regardless of the disposition a soldier might 
make of his pay, he still expected to see his name on the payroll once a month.”15  
Military pay problems were so bad during World War II, General George C. Marshall 
had to notify all theater commanders about the number of men with pay problems and 
give them special attention in correcting their pay.16  “Throughout the war, the payment of 
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soldiers constituted Finance’s central concern.  The immense problems it faced in paying 
enlisted men and officers around the globe revealed the inadequacy of prescribed 
procedures.17  The inability to pay military personnel continues today.  
Close to a new calendar year in 2003, a deployed wing commander sent an 
emergency email to the CENTAF Commander concerning the fact that many of his 
deployed airmen entitlements had not been started, and this would affect their W-2s.  
This error was caused by simple tactical exchange of data between the finance and 
personnel airmen on the ground.  The personnel airmen recently arrived in-theater and 
did not forward a list to their finance personnel.  The finance airmen didn’t bother to ask 
for the list since they just arrived themselves.  The end result was that several general 
officers, SESs, colonels, and many others spent countless labor hours stateside to fix the 
problem prior to W-2s being processed.18  
The lack of mobilization planning during OEF and OIF proved that a strategic 
decision to mobilize forces coupled with an administrative error in not paying those 
forces had strategic consequences causing hardships for family members and reserve 
personnel.  The GAO Report 04-413T titled “Military Pay: Army National Guard 
Personnel Mobilized to Active Duty Experience Significant Pay Problems” highlights 
many of the pay problems experienced by our reserve component forces.19  A Google 
search of Air National Guard (ANG) pay problems brings up only Army issues.  
However, Captain Dan Gilbert, former ANG FM Warplanner, states that the Air Force 
also had significant pay problems.20  Most were remedied within 60-days due to the 
forward-looking Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC). 
ACC and AMC FM Warplanners knew that home station support requirements 
would increase under mobilization.  The increased workload included orders processing, 
travel voucher processing, military pay and entitlement starts and stops, and death 
gratuities.  Both commands mobilized at least three financial management personnel at 
each Air Reserve Component (ARC) base.  For those bases that did not have personnel 
deploying, the mobilized personnel were moved to man Crisis Action Teams located at 
the ANG, ACC, and Air Force headquarters.  Additionally, ARC personnel augmented 
heavily tasked active duty units.  A special reserve team was sent to Robins AFB to 
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process all Individual Mobilization Augmentee travel vouchers.  The backlog was 
successfully reduced from 60 plus days to 3 days.21  The next step after mobilizations 
planning is deployment planning. 
Deployment planning confusion plagued warplanners during WWII. Colonel 
Bickford E. Sawyer urged finance offices to give service on a geographic, rather than an 
organizational, basis during WWII,22 however commanding officers did not want to lose 
their finance personnel nor process payments for personnel outside their command.  
During the Leyte invasion, finance teams from Sixth Army, Fifth Air Force, and U.S. 
Army Forces Far East operated at the same location.  After this collocation experience, 
the three finance organization agreed to coordinate their future locations to eliminate 
duplication of effort.23  During the Okinawa campaign, there was no unified planning for 
administrative control of the air, ground, and service forces disbursing operations.  The 
same lack of planning was experienced during OEF and OIF. 
The largest concern for most services today is to fill individual augmentation 
requirements.  Combatant commands determine and validate requirements to support 
specific missions, and subsequently task the Service component commands to provide 
individuals to meet those requirements. If the Service component does not have sufficient 
personnel to meet requirements, the shortfalls will be identified and assigned to another 
Service.  Current, individual augmentation includes intelligence, finance, dog handlers, 
and other specialties.  The individual augmentation is due in large part because the Army 
is the executive agent in Central Command.   
General Franks selected the Army as the executive agent for Afghanistan and 
Iraq.24  However, due to lack of service or insufficient resources provided by the Army, 
the air wings were inadequately serviced.  Now, Army and Air Force finance teams are 
collocated at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan; Ballad Air Base, Iraq; Baghdad 
International Airport, Iraq; Eskon Village, Saudi Arabia; Tallil AB, Iraq; and Ali Al 
Salem AB, Kuwait.25  The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was intended to fix the “long-
standing inability or unwillingness of the four U.S. services to work harmoniously either 
in the policy arena or at the operational level.”26  This duplication of effect reduces the  
 
 11
effectiveness and speed, and increases the size of support required in contingency 
operations.  This is counterproductive for a military that is supposed to be agile and lean.  
Once the forces are deployed, they have to be sustained. 
The sustainment of the deployed forces is supported by Congress through the 
appropriation process. During World War II, “Congress and the War Department 
exercised sound judgment on budgeting and accounting . . . Prosecution of the war took 
precedence over orderly business methods, for it was manifestly more important to win 
the war than to maintain a tidy set of books.”27  During World War II, the Army was not 
limited on appropriations that were in effect in peacetime.28  Congress did expect them to 
properly account for the approximately $175 billion it spent.  The ultimate object of 
Army accounting was to inform Congress of how much money was spent and for what 
purposes.29  President Roosevelt did not want to put a dollar sign on the price of victory.  
Since World War II, Congress has taken a more active role with the accounting of 
appropriated funds.    
Congress has become very involved in the execution of wartime dollars.  They 
have steadily increased their role in oversight from Vietnam to current operations.  A 
quote from Major General Leonard Taylor, who served as Assistant Director and Director 
of Army Budget during Vietnam, says: 
Vietnam is different to financial managers, it might have been more 
appropriate to say, “Vietnam was a nightmare.”  It was much like starting 
out a game of baseball with the normal rules and during the third inning, 
finding out that you were playing basketball.  Those of us involved in 
financial management believed that we would handle this war much as we 
had done the Korean conflict.  This meant that there would be no 
requirement for stringent accounting controls or budgeting and that a 
sufficient amount of funds would be available.  This assumption was 
responsible to a large degree for the lack of an adequate organization for 
financial management in the early days of the buildup.  When the rules 
were clarified, and we found that we were expected to establish virtually a 
peacetime system for financial control and reporting, it was almost too 
late.30 
According to the House of Representatives website, the House Armed Services 
Committee held over 50 hearings in 2004.  Also on their website, there were 10 hearings 
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on varying aspects of the supplemental appropriation in 2005 alone.31  After the end of 
major combat operations and the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 
billions of dollars were spent on reconstruction.  According to a Washington Times 
article by Rowan Scarborough, the chaotic environment in Iraqi “should have sent strong 
signals to CPA financial managers that weaknesses were widespread, posed unacceptable 
risks and called for forceful action.”32  With increased scrutiny of discretionary dollars by 
Congress, orderly business methods are taking precedence over the prosecution and 
winning of current operations and the Global War on Terrorism making accounting more 
important.   
Accounting during World War II was dual natured.  The first part was 
supervisory; the second consisted of intensive examination of accounts known as 
auditing.  Each major overseas command was assigned a regional auditing office.33  These 
offices reviewed and analyzed disbursing officers’ accounts.  These audits helped identify 
who needed assistance and helped compile reports on procurements and other financial 
data. 
Accounting has not changed much since WWII.   “Before a finance officer could 
pay a vendor for goods or services delivered to the Army, he needed complete 
procurement papers and receiving reports, so contracting, receiving, and finance officers 
had to work together closely to pay commercial bills.”34  Finance departments did not use 
new methods since the wartime system extended those methods used in peacetime.  The 
accounting of public funds was the same in all theaters, with little variation.  Accounting 
in the field was the most important phase of the Army’s overseas finance mission.35  The 
same holds true today and the support documentation remains the same.  The second 
function of accounting is auditing. 
Today’s audits of the Coalition Provisional Authority and ongoing operations, 
affirm that funds and contracts were managed with inadequate protection against “waste 
of Iraqi and U.S. funds, and in many cases, bypassed federally mandated procedures for 
awarding and overseeing contracts.”36  The Defense Department’s Office of Inspector 
General sent auditors into Iraq when the war started to ensure taxpayers were getting their 
money’s worth.37  By 2004, all auditors were withdrawn.  They believed other agencies 
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such as the Defense Contract Audit Agency, and the GAO could handle the requirements.  
Many experts believe that those other agencies don’t have the expertise, access and broad 
mandate that the Inspector General has.38  These auditors and accounting personnel 
depend on the accuracy and documentation of the disbursing agent. 
Disbursing officers and paying agents are the backbone of FM contingency 
operations.  “In both prewar and wartime operations, an important administrative link in 
the Finance department’s chain of service was the agent system.”39  The disbursing 
officer was accountable for public funds.  Paying agents reported to disbursing officers 
and had the same powers but could not sign Treasury Checks.40  “One of the great 
advantages of using ‘paying’ agents was the ease with which they could be moved to 
locations where needed.”41  Using agents saved time because there was less paperwork 
involved than in establishing a new disbursing officer account.  In the Philippines, the 
Army employed agents extensively.42  The Air Force employed agent finance officers 
regularly during World War II while the Army has used both disbursing officers and 
agents.43  The Army still deploys both kinds of disbursing personnel while the Air Force 
exclusively uses paying agents in contingency environments.   
Another issue with disbursing officers and paying agents is that their skill set is 
slowly being eroded by automation.  In the Armed Forces Comptroller magazine, Spring 
2004 issue, Francis Machina stated, “the overwhelming majority of effort and training in 
the field of disbursing has migrated to electronic means at the expense of manual 
payment knowledge.”44  This statement was validated with conversations of members on 
the CENTAF staff and a thesis prepared by Major Murch.  While attending Army 
Command and Staff College, he found that manual processing of disbursing vouchers 
was an area of weakness in training programs.45  This is an example of automated 
operations eroding a vital contingency skill set.  This erosion is the direct result of 
financial management organizational structure. 
3. Organizational Structure 
During World War II, overseas theaters each operated within the framework of 
their mission and environment.  “Consequently, considerable variations existed among 
the ways theaters and their subordinate organizations handled financial matters.”46   Each 
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theater had an office that coordinated all aspects of fiscal service in its area.  The 
principal duties were to receive accounting documents, post collections and expenditures, 
process disbursing records, reconcile accounts, and control and account for funds allotted 
for the theater.47   Today, the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force continue to organize and 
operate differently in a contingency environment. 
Many of the differences can be traced back to two things: the establishment of 
Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS) and whether the service is functional or 
customer oriented.  Each service capitalized DFAS differently.  They selected different 
capabilities that they wanted to keep “in-house.”48  This has led to differences in 
disbursing operations.  In addition, financial management systems were developed by the 
services and not by the Department of Defense.  The Army aligned itself around the 
customer.  Anything affecting the soldier was put into the J-1 (personnel and finance).  
Anything affecting the unit was placed in the J-8 (resource management and manpower).  
The Air Force chose a functional organization.  Everything that is finance related falls 
under the comptroller.  Additional differences are discussed in the next two chapters and 
below.    
During OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI 
FREEDOM, 3rd Army was the Army Component to United States Central Command.  
Their J-8 directorate was responsible to allocate funding for the operations.  However, the 
finance battalion from Ft. Hood was the authority for military pay, travel, disbursement 
and accounting requirement during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.  This 
function falls under the J-1 directorate and did not have a reporting chain to 3rd Army.  It 
was not until the Combined Forces Land Component Commander moved forward from 
home station to theater that the finance role fell under 3rd Army’s control.49  Unity of 
effort and unity of command was lacking with this relationship.  The end results were no 
single point of contact to determine expenditures in the area of operations and there was 
not centralized command and control of all comptroller operations. 
Over the past two years, the Air Force has learned some of these lessons and, 
according to MSgt Mike Linville, CENTAF, warfighting headquarters now has financial 
management (resource management), accounting liaison, and disbursing under the direct 
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control of the A-8.50  All Air Force warfighting headquarters finance and comptroller 
responsibilities are assigned to the A-8, subordinate to the A-8 as the A-82, or assigned as 
the special staff of the commander.  They have adopted the Centralized Processing Site 
concept, ultimately responsible for the all resource management and finance functions 
within their assigned combatant command area of operation.  The Centralized Processing 
Site concept will be explained in Chapter IV.  Pacific Air Force is the only warfighting 
headquarters that does not operate under this concept.  During initial operations, they will 
function like the Army.  Individual units supporting the initial forces will provide their 
own funding and disbursing capabilities. 
C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
World War II Financial management operations highlighted many pitfalls that the 
lack of planning and leadership can cause.  Brigadier General Larry Spencer wrote in his 
article “The Green Eyeshades of War” that history has constantly repeated itself.  In the 
article, he highlights reoccurring shortfalls during Korean War, Vietnam War, 
OPERATION DESERT STORM, OPERATIONS URGENT FURY, OPERATION 
JUST CAUSE, and OPERATIONS NOBLE ANVIL.  Major Jeffery Eskridge also 
highlighted many shortfalls in his thesis, “An Analysis of Finance Operations from 
World War II to the Vietnam Conflict-Was Any Progress Made?”  Hugh Tant’s paper 
titled “Finance Corps: Reformulated for the 21st Century” examined OERATIONS 
DESERT STORM and DESERT SHIELD.  He highlighted lack of command and control 
during both of these operations.  This coupled with current examples during OEF and 
OIF highlight the fact that we have not learned our lessons well even with over 60 years 
of experience. 
There are several reasons why financial management and comptroller personnel 
have not learned the lessons of history.  First, war is generational.  Each generation 
experiences it anew.  Seldom were there experienced personnel from OPERATION 
DESERT STORM or NOBLE ANVIL that could be tasked at a headquarters level to 
draw information or lessons learned on establishing policy, plans, or executing the 
mission.  As stated earlier, warplanning was not a top priority in the finance community.  
The major focus is current executions of $400 billion defense budget or preparing for the 
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next budget cycle.  Lastly, the network of people and infrastructure of systems that is 
available at homestation is not available in a remote theater.  Although these are reasons 
for repeating failures, they are poor excuses.   
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III. U.S. ARMY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
Have money and a good army: they ensure the glory and safety of a 
prince. 
  Frederick Wilhelm I of Prussia: to his son (later, Frederick the Great)51 
 
A. PRESENTATION OF ARMY FINANCE FORCES 
The United States Army supports the objectives of National Military Strategy by 
being structured as an expeditionary force organized around the concept of projecting 
power.  Force projection is the idea of maintaining a limited overseas presence, while at 
the same time having the ability to project military power any where in the world with a 
flexible and rapidly deployable land force consisting of armored, light, and special 
operations forces units.52   
The force projection concept provides the flexibility to deploy military forces 
from bases in the United States and overseas locations in support of contingency 
operations around the world.  The Army conducts operations by rapidly projecting 
deployable, lethal, versatile, expandable, and sustainable forces.53  The recent military 
operations being conducted in support of the Global War on Terrorism are examples of 
how the force projection concept is executed.   
The intensity of a conflict dictates which resource management functions are 
performed and at what level they will be performed.  During the transition phase of 
operations, the emphasis on financial management is subordinated to the demands of the 
operation; therefore, comptroller operations are greatly diminished.  There is only one 
comptroller in the theater and comptroller operations below theater level are either 
transferred to the theater comptroller or transferred outside the theater as determined by 
the Comptroller of the Army. 
In order to build and sustain forces, the Army uses combat support and combat 
service support elements.  The mission of these service and support organizations is to 
provide necessary resources to the combatant commanders at the tactical and operational 
levels to build and sustain combat power of the force in the form of soldiers, equipment, and 
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weapons systems in remote regions of the world.54  The Army Finance Corps is classified as a 
combat service support organization that along with other logistical resource management 
elements, deploy as modular finance units with the supported force.55  Army financial 
management is separated into two distinctive processes.  These processes are finance 
operations and resource management operations.   
Finance operations are the activities associated with finance management support 
that occur at the user level in direct support of the operational forces.  Finance operations 
are conducted by finance units structured around a modular force design that provides 
tailored support to the operational forces in theater ranging from the Corps level down to 
the maneuver companies.  The size of the finance unit and the level of support will vary 
according to the size of the supported unit and the nature of the operation.  These finance 
units deploy with the operational forces they support and provide all finance services for 
those units to include the needs of the individual soldiers.  Finance units execute the most 
critical mission of providing direct support for the procurement process in the theater by 
providing currency and banking support for operations.  Finance units also provide 
funding support to other US and allied organizations, coordinate finance support 
requirements and perform the central funding and accounting mission, provide financial 
advice and guidance, provide military pay support to the individual soldiers and 
Department of Defense civilians and travel support.56  
Resource management operations are characterized as comptroller activities that 
ensure financial controls are in place and followed to properly plan, account for and 
report the expenditure of funds for an operation. “The resource management mission is to 
analyze the commander's tasks and priorities, and to identify the financial resource 
requirements which will enable the commander to accomplish the mission.  The resource 
manager must be proactive in planning, developing, administering, and supervising the 
preparation, analysis, justification, and execution of programs and budgets.  Resource 
managers acquire, program, budget, allocate, distribute, and control all funds, evaluate 
and report the execution of funds.  Resource managers ensure the effective and efficient 
use of scarce funding resources to conduct or support command operations under any 
circumstances.”57   
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In order to ensure commanders receive the proper finance and resource 
management support for operations, Army finance and resource management elements 
operate at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command.  But it is at the 
operational level and below that the majority of wartime financial management 
operations are conducted.  To ensure needed financial support is received, the combatant 
commander has direct access to the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) 
through the Deputy Chief of Staff Resource Management (DCSRM) and Finance 
Command (FINCOM) for coordination of support.  The DCSRM and the FINCOM 
commander are the points of contact to ensure that resource management operations and 
finance operations are conducted to adequately support the theater combatant commander 
by planning for and managing financial management organizations supporting the 
operational force structure.58  At the tactical level, the responsibilities of resource 
management and finance operations are those of the Corps Assistant Chief of Staff 
Resource Management Resource Management (ACSRM)/Division RM and the Finance 
Group (FG)/Finance Battalion (FB) commanders, who are the principal staff advisors to 
the corps/division commander, staff, and subordinate commanders in all matters relating 
to financial management operations.  The following figure shows how the financial 
management organizational structure corresponds with the organizational structure at the 




Figure 3.   Echelons of Finance Support (Source:  U.S. Army FM 14-100) 
 
The Deputy Chief of Staff Resource Management has the mission to formulate 
plans and policies for the utilization of command and material resources and to provide 
advice and guidance to the ASCC commander, subordinate commanders and their staffs 
concerning resources. The Deputy Chief of Staff Resource Management issues guidance 
throughout the command.  The Deputy Chief of Staff Resource Management is the Army 
liaison to the ASA (FM&C) and has technical supervision of the resource managers in the 
ASCC who are not Assistant Chief of Staff Resource Managements or Division RMs.  
The DCSRM may establish an internal review section in theater that plans and executes 
audits and inspections, data collection, and systems analysis functions for the ASCC.  
The DCSRM is also designed to be modular and tailorable to support the operational 





Figure 4.   Organizational  Structure For Division Resource Management (Source:  
U.S. Army FM 14-100) 
 
“The FINCOM performs theater/ASCC level finance operations.”61  The basic 
mission of the FINCOM is to formulate plans and policies in order to effectively manage 
the utilization of finance management resources in the theater.  The FINCOM 
commander provides advice and guidance to the ASCC commander and all finance units 
in the theater.  The FINCOM serves as the theater central funding source for all 
subordinate finance units as well as other U.S. and allied organizations when directed by 
the theater commander.  As the chief ASCC finance and accounting officer, the FINCOM 
commander provides financial policies to theater finance organizations, and exercises 
command and control over the Army Finance units.62  The FINCOM commander may 
assume responsibility for policy, overall direction, and coordination of strategic and 
operational finance and accounting tasks that pertain to all Service components, to 
include command and control of other Services' finance elements.63 
The FINCOM has the capability to deploy in modular, tailorable cells. The 
FINCOM is capable of augmenting other finance units.  Normally the first sections 
needed in a theater are the central funding cell and the policy cell, followed by an 
operations cell, and a command and control cell.  The FINCOM will deploy only those 
necessary forces into theater to accomplish the mission.  The FINCOM will deploy when 
two or more finance groups are deployed, or when other operational factors demand the 
capabilities of the FINCOM.64  “The FINCOM, like other finance units, will project 
capabilities with a minimal footprint on the battlefield.”65  
When the FINCOM deploys to the theater, other organizations will assign 
personnel to assist.  “DFAS will, upon request, deploy liaison personnel to support the 
FINCOM in providing support to the combatant commander.  DFAS is the owner of most 
financial management systems operated by deployed finance units and they deploy to 
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assist in operating those systems.  The USAFINCOM, as an agency of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA (FM&C)), also 
provides liaison between deployed finance units and the ASA (FM&C). USAFINCOM 
also provides liaison between deployed finance units and DFAS.  USAFINCOM provides 
prepotency, policy, and guidance for finance and accounting mobilization and 
contingency operations.”66       
Responsibilities of the FINCOM include:  
1.  Coordination and assistance on issues of Host Nation Support. 
2.  Establish Limited Depository Accounts (LDAs). 
3.  Provide financial management advice and assistance. 
4.  Determine accounting and central funding support necessary for the 
operation and establish finance and accounting plans. 
5.  Develop and implement plans to review tactical finance and accounting 
networks to monitor integration of DFAS equipment used by Army 
finance and accounting organizations on the battlefield.67   
The FINCOM structure is shown in the figure below.  
 
 
Figure 5.   Organizational Structure for Finance Command (Source:  U.S. Army FM 
14-100) 
 
The mission of the Assistant Chief of Staff Resource Management (ACSRM) is 
very similar to the Deputy Chief of Staff Resource Management, but at the Corps level.  
The ACSRM provides support to the Corps by formulating plans and policies that most 
effectively utilize command and material resources.  The ACSRM provides advice and 
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guidance concerning resources to the Corps commander, subordinate commanders, and 
their staffs.  The ACSRM plans and executes audits and inspections, data collection, and 




Figure 6.   Organizational Structure for Corps Resource Management (Source:  U.S. 
Army FM 14-100) 
 
The finance group (FG) can be responsible for finance management support for 
either a Corps or ASCC Command with the primary combat service support mission of 
funding finance battalions, commercial vendor payments, accounting, travel pay, 
disbursement and collection of funds, and non-US pay services.  The finance group 
provides support to organizations by planning and coordinating with supported 
commands.  The finance group has three organic subordinate finance battalions within its 
organizational structure that provide direct financial support to the operational units on an 
area basis within the theater.   
The finance group should deploy anytime the Corps deploys or anytime two or 
more finance battalions deploys in support of an operation. The FG commander directs 
deployment of subordinate finance battalions.  However, in some circumstances, the 
finance group headquarters may or may not deploy depending upon the size of the 
operational force needing support and the tactical situation.69 
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Pending the deployment of the FG, its functions will be accomplished 
from its current location. An advance party coordinates the movement of 
the FG into the new area of operations. The advance party establishes 
initial communications with subordinate FBs.  For an expanded corps task 
force and upon direction of the FG commander, FBs will deploy to 
provide support when the tactical situation permits. FBs will deploy at the 
direction of the FG commander.  The relationships FBs have with the 
divisions play a critical role in the deployment of these FBs. These 
relationships are a prime consideration in deployment operations. 
Depending on the deployment schedule, finance units may deploy in 
modular, tailorable elements. These elements are Finance Detachments 
(FD) or Finance Support Teams (FST).70 
The finance group commander is a colonel/O-6 who exercises command and 
operational control over all corps finance organizations. The finance group commander is 
the ASCC or Corps finance staff officer directly responsible to the commander or deputy 
commander.71  Some of the Finance Group responsibilities include: 
1.  Support Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 
2.  Provide financial management advice and assistance. 
3. Control currency. 
4. Provide banking and currency support. 
5.  Support contracting/local procurement efforts.  
6.  Capture costs. 
7.  Provide pay support to Enemy Prisoner of War.72 
 
 




The Division RM provides resource management support at the division level.  
Division RM formulates plans and policies that most effectively utilize command and 
material resources at the division.  The Division RM provides advice and guidance to the 
division commander, subordinate commanders, and their staffs concerning resources.  
The Division RM plans and executes audits and inspections, data collection, and systems 
analysis functions for the division and reports directly to the Division Chief of Staff.  The 
Division RM has a modular, tailorable design which deploys to the area of operations 
only those elements required to support the mission. The Division RM unit structure is 
shown in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Organizational Structure for Division Resource Management (Source:  U.S. 
Army FM 14-100) 
 
The Finance Battalion (FB) provides finance support to division by either general 
or direct support on an area basis within a division operational area.  The finance 
battalion provides finance support to commanders, units, activities, and soldiers as 
directed by the finance group commander to include Army, joint, and multinational 
commands, units, soldiers, and authorized civilians located within the finance battalion’s 
assigned area of operations.73  
The FB is under the command and control of any finance echelon above them. 
The FB may be assigned to an area of operations which parallels the logistics area of 
operations of a division. If there are no distinct boundaries on a non-linear, non-
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contiguous battlefield, the FB commander faces an even greater challenge of providing 
effective finance support. The FB has a modular, tailorable design which deploys to the 
area of operations only those elements required to support the deployed force. The FB is 
capable of augmenting other finance units.  The FB consists of the FB headquarters 
detachment and 2-6 Finance Detachments (FD). The FB commander exercises command 
and control over the assigned FDs.74 
The FB commander is a lieutenant colonel/O-5 who is responsible for the 
command and control of two-to-six finance detachments as well as their tactical and 
technical operational employment.  The finance battalion typically is under the command 
and control of the finance group commander, but if the finance battalion is not assigned 
to an FG, the FB will report directly to the finance command.75 The responsibilities of the 
finance battalion includes 
1. Military Pay 
2. Commercial vendor services 
3. Disbursement and collection of funds 
4. Finance database support-soldiers pay records 
The finance battalion structure is shown in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Organizational Structure for Finance Battalion (Source:  U.S. Army FM 14-
100) 
 
Finance Detachments (FD) are the lowest level, smallest sized elements on the 
Army finance corps table of organization that can deploy separately as part of an 
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operational unit or task force.  The finance detachment typically reports to the finance 
battalion; however, is capable of deploying separately as part of a task force but will 
require administrative and logistical support from the supported task force.  Usually when 
deployed as part of a task force, the FD is attached for operational control to the task 
force with the FD reporting directly to the Task Force commander.  The detachment 
receives policy and guidance from the finance battalion commander and his staff.  The 
finance detachment is capable of providing finance support for units and personnel in the 
area of operations designated by the finance battalion commander that is typically 
occupied by a brigade-sized element up to 6,000 soldiers.   
The finance detachment has the responsibility to provide military pay support, 
commercial vendor services, disbursement and collection of funds, and finance data base 
maintenance for units and personnel in its area of operations.  The finance detachment 
provides support by deploying finance support teams (FST) consisting of two-to-five 
soldiers within the finance battalion's designated area to the supported operational unit's 
location for short periods of time.  The finance support teams are supported by their 
parent detachment or battalion for all necessary administration, transportation, supply, 
and maintenance requirements.      
The finance detachment commander is a captain/O-3 and is under the command 
and control of a finance battalion.76  The finance detachment commander is responsible 
directly to the finance battalion commander and may act as the deputy commander or 
finance officer for the battalion as well as maintain command and control of the 
detachment.77  The finance detachment structure is shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 10.   Organizational Structure for Finance Detachment (Source:  U.S. Army FM 
14-100) 
 
The Finance Support Teams (FST) provides finance support to all units and 
soldiers in their area of responsibility. The FST provides soldiers with disbursing support, 
travel support, commercial vendor services support, US pay (including civilian pay) 
support, and non-US pay support. Any documents that the FST cannot process are 
returned to the finance operations branch for processing. All accountable items are 
cleared through the disbursing branch of the finance detachment. 
FSTs have a modular design, enabling them to augment other finance units.  To 
perform its mission, the FST must rely on higher echelons for all necessary equipment 
and transportation. There support can only be for a short duration from the finance 
detachment.78 
B. TRAINING 
The U.S. Army has developed detailed training for every echelon in Financial 
Management.  Table 1 contains the Army Training and Evaluation Program Mission 
Training Plan for each finance command, finance battalion, finance group, and finance 
detachment.  These documents follow the basic doctrine for training.  They are the 
primary and comprehensive training program essential to training finance units on its 






10/30/2003 MISSION TRAINING PLAN FOR FINANCE GROUP PDF
ARTEP 14-
423-30-MTP 
10/30/2003 MISSION TRAINING PLAN FOR FINANCE DETACHMENT PDF
ARTEP 14-
426-MTP 
11/06/2003 MISSION TRAINING PLAN FOR HEADQUARTERS AND 




10/30/2003 MISSION TRAINING PLAN FOR FINANCE COMMAND PDF
 
Table 1. Army Mission Training Plans  
 
The training plans highlight six areas of responsibility.  They are: 
1. Unit Training  
2. Training Matrix 
3. Mission Outline/Training Plan 
4. Training Exercise 
A. Field Training Exercises 
B. Situational Training Exercises 
5. Training and Evaluations Outlines. 
6. External Evaluations 
The development of Mission Training Plans, use of Mission Essential Task Lists, 
higher guidance and directives, and training priorities provide an excellent focus for 
training programs.  But Major Murch sites in his thesis two major training limitations.  
They are lack of training resources (time) and opportunities.  Time is always an issue for 
commanders.  They are balancing accomplishing the homestation mission while 
preparing for war.  Training opportunities can be increased with proper planning by 
leadership. 
C. CURRENT ARMY FM CONTINGENCY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
In contingency operations, a minimal Comptroller staff deploys with the force 
Commander’s staff. The Course of Action directs the necessary financial operational and 
management requirements of the theater, which determines the structure of the 
comptroller’s staff.  If necessary, the Theater Finance Support Center would deploy to the 
theater to provide area finance support to the soldiers and units in a theater.80  Camp  
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Doha is the current center for U.S. Central Command Army Component.  Some of the 
aspects of the Army FM Contingency Concept of Operations were discussed in Chapter 
II of this project.   
Camp Doha serves as a central processing center only for sites with minimal 
capabilities that do not deploy with their own unit paying agents.  The robust and mature 
bases with the communication infrastructure send their accounting and disbursing 
information directly to DFAS-Indianapolis.  Those units that prefer to bring their own 
agent use ASCC fund cites but report disbursing information back to home station.81  This 
causes a “for others” transaction.  The Department of the Army informs the ASCC how 
much they have spent.  The Army has partial control and decentralized execution.   
D. GOAL 
This chapter has given the reader background information that will be important 
in the recommendation and conclusion chapter.  It provided an overview of how the 
Army deploys according to Army Field Manuals.  Effective training ensures a deployable 
capability.  The current operation section highlights how the Army is currently operating.  
Some areas of concern that will be addressed in Chapter V, are the command structure 
and capabilities.  The section allows the reader to compare operations with the Air Force.    
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IV. U.S. AIR FORCE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
They [the Athenians] have abundance of gold and silver, and these make 
war, like other things, go smoothly 
       Hermocrates of Syracuse82 
 
A. PRESENTATION OF FORCES  
The United States Air Force deploys based on the Air Expeditionary Force 
Concept.  The deployed organizational structure is called an Air and Space Expeditionary 
Task Force (AETF).  “The AETF presents a Joint Forces Commander with a task-
organized, integrated package with the appropriate balance of force, sustainment, control, 
and force protection.”83  The AETF provides a scalable and tailorable organization.  
AETFs will support a Numbered Air Force (NAF) which is the warfighting echelon to be 
offered to a joint commander. 
The NAF commander is also the Commander of Air Force forces (COMAFFOR).  
The COMAFFOR exercises operational and service (administrative) control.84  
Operational control is the full authority to organize forces and to employ those forces as 
necessary to accomplish assigned missions.  All Air Force personnel assigned to theater 
whether attached to a joint position or an Air Force position is commanded by the 
COMAFFOR.  This is service control.  The COMAFFOR is usually given the operations 
command of all air assets and functions as the Joint Forces Air Component Commanders.  
Service control or administrative control is exercised through the A-Staff.   
The A-Staff functions are aligned according to J-Staff functions.  They may also 
include forward and rear echelons.  The Comptroller can function as either the A-8, the 
A-82 (subordinate to the A-8), or on the Commander’s Special Staff.  The financial 
management function is very important.  As one of our senior FM officers, recently 
returning from command under hostile operations, said:  
Make no mistake FMers: The primary reason you are employed by the 
U.S. military is to fight and finance our nation’s wars. It is likely that you 
will experience combat operations while you are in FM and you need to  
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have the tools necessary to meet the challenges.  Deployment is a way of 
life in today’s Air Force and is an inherently dangerous business. You are 
employed to meet those challenges.”85   
The A and special staff oversees the deployment and sustainment of Air Force forces.   
Sustainment of forces is provided by Agile Combat Support (ACS).  “ACS 
underpins the ability of the AEF to provide force capabilities that can rapidly respond by 
creating, sustaining, and protecting all air and space power capabilities to accomplish 
mission objectives.”86   The expeditionary capabilities of ACS assure AEFs are supported 
and are able to operate with a small support footprint and streamlined infrastructure 
requirements.  ACS functions include civil engineering, financial management, 
contracting, chaplains, and other combat service support functions.  All forces deploy in a 
Unit Type Code (UTC).   
UTCs are a unit of capability focused upon accomplishment of a specific mission.  
UTCs can be used across the range of military operations from peacekeeping operations 
to major theater wars.87  Small UTCs that build upon each other may be necessary to 
provide greater capability at a given location.  The key element in modular/scalable 
UTCs is that the resources that make up a UTC are mutually exclusive of each other.  
Every financial management authorization is supposed to be postured in UTCs. 
Finance personnel and equipment are postured into ten UTCs designed to provide 
the full spectrum of FM capabilities. The UTCs vary in number of personnel, grade and 
skill levels. Single or combinations of UTCs support the full spectrum of military 




Table 2. Unit Type Code Description (Source: AFH 65-115) 
 
These UTCs range from an individuals to a 5-man team.  They are scalable and 
used as building blocks.  A XFFAC is composed of an XFFA1, XFFA2, XFFAE, 
XFFA7, and a senior enlisted position.  The senior enlisted member was added to make 
sure every authorization was accounted for when posturing and to provide senior enlisted 
 34
leadership.  XFFAD is composed of an XFFA1, XFFA2, and XFFA7.  Appendix A 
contains the full mission capabilities statement with composition and skill levels of each 
UTC.   
B. TRAINING 
The financial management career field has established, implemented, or enhanced 
contingency training over the past five years.  Financial management personnel now 
deploy on two Air Force level exercises called Silver Flag and Eagle Flag.  The Air Force 
added a UTC training checklist.  The financial management transformation team is also 
developing an Officer contingency course.  The Combat Comptroller Familiarization 
Course was modified into two specific training segments for basic (E-5 and below) and 
advanced (E-6 and above).88  CENTAF A-8 also offers an orientation course for their 
deployed locations.  All of these initiatives have been implemented since 9/11.   
Silver Flag is a multifunctional contingency and war skills training exercise “for 
combat support forces, aimed at improving the ability to operate in a forward location, 
both functionally and as an integrated, multi-functional team.  It emphasizes individual 
and small team skills, bed down and mission support planning, execution, and command 
and control.”89  The Financial Management Silver Flag program is designed to combine 
classroom training with a practical, hands-on exercise to provide advanced disbursing 
agent training.  Specific areas of training are Deployed Fiscal Law/Contingency 
Contracting, Accounting Operations, Automated Agent Balancing Spreadsheet, and Air 
Reserve Component Pay Support.90  This training exercise is mandatory for all E-6s and 
E-6 selects.  Officers will be added at a later date. 
Eagle Flag is an Air Force-level Expeditionary Combat Support exercise.  “The 
goal of Eagle Flag is to provide Airmen with an environment to exercise the knowledge 
and skills required to open and establish an air base and achieve initial operating 
capability, for any type of forward operation, in any environment, regardless of mission 
or aircraft type.  Eagle Flag is considered a final rehearsal of the expeditionary combat 




control.”91  The Financial Management UTCs that are used in this exercise are XFFA3, 
(2) XFFA2, and XFFA1.  Eagle Flag exercises coincide with individual training 
schedules for future deployments. 
A signed memorandum dated 25 Oct 2004 by the Assistant Secretary of the Air 
Force for Financial Management and Comptroller stated that the UTC task lists are 
mandatory tools for deployment preparations.92  The purpose of the list is to define the 
job tasks associated with each UTC.  The supervisor, trainer and trainee must sign-off on 
each task.  The UTC task list is attached in Appendix B. 
C. CURRENT AIR FORCE FM CONTINGENCY CONCEPT OF 
OPERATIONS 
Over the last 15 years, CENTAF (9th AF) at Shaw AFB, South Carolina has 
developed a concept of Centralized Processing Site (CPS).  This process has been 
adopted by all other war fighting headquarters except Pacific Air Forces.  The CPS’s 
primary mission is to assist with the command and control of deployed comptroller forces 
within an Area of Responsibility.  Its secondary mission is to allow “reach-back” 
capabilities to those forces in an Area of Responsibility.93  The CPS is a permanent 
steady-state staff that performs theater-level command and control.  Its organization 
allows for responsive, agile, versatile and sustainable mission support across the planning 
continuum. 
The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America dated March 
2005, highlights “reach-back” as a key operational capability that enables a more 
effective employment of people and capabilities without deploying them forward.  The 
“reach-back” capability in the CPS ensures deployed commanders’ financial management 
needs are fully met while maintaining a smaller forward-deployed footprint.  The CPS 
helps plan and execute disbursing operations, budget authority and guidance; accounting 
liaison; conduct AOR orientation; and issue overall policy and procedure guidance.  All 
comptroller responsibilities will fall under the warfighting comptroller except for military 
pay and travel pay which will be the responsibility of the new Air Force Call Center.  
Documentation for disbursing, accounting, military pay and travel is completed in 
the field manually.  For military pay entitlement, the A-1 (personnel) provides the list of 
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newly arrived personnel to the forwarded deployed finance unit.  The deployed finance 
unit then forwards this list to be processed by the CPS or another centralized location.  
CENTAF bases forwards entitlement starts to Al Udeid AB, Qatar.  The accounting and 
disbursing documents at each deployed location are scanned using a high speed scanner 
and saved on the Air Force Knowledge website.  These files are then downloaded by the 
CPS located at Shaw AFB, SC for CENTAF and processed into the disbursing and 
accounting systems.94  Travel accrual vouchers, final travel voucher and military pay 
entitlement stops are processed at home station.  The CPS typifies the centralized control 
and decentralized execution that the Air Force believes in.     
Deployed financial management personnel only have view capability in the 
military pay system and the accounting system.  The only personnel with “write” 
capability into the military pay system are the financial management personnel at Al 
Udeid AB.  Financial managers can query the systems.  They also have access to the 
Army portion of the military pay system.  The disbursing system is limited to the CPS 
site.95  This process minimizes the need for communication infrastructure and the forward 
footprint required for separation of duties and management controls.   
The Air Force has stayed true to its WWII roots.  There is only one Disbursing 
Officer in the Air Force.  He has Deputy Disbursing Officers at each of the Air Force 
Warfighting Headquarters.  Each site that is geographically separated from the HQs is 
serviced by a paying agent.  To maintain paying agent speed and agility, agents still 
manually complete the disbursing and accounting paperwork.  It is then scanned into a 
file and uploaded to a website.  The AF Warfighting HQ downloads and processes the 
forms into the accounting and disbursing systems.  This eliminated the need to have 
immediate connectivity and increases their movement and flexibility. 
D. GOAL 
This chapter has given the reader background information that will be important 
in the recommendation and conclusion chapter.  It provided an overview of how the Air 
Force deploys according to Air Force Instructions.  Effective training ensures a 
deployable capability.  The current operation section highlights how the Air Force is 
currently operating.  Detailed process flow charts for accounting, military pay, travel, and 
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disbursing for the Air Force is located in Appendix C.  Accounting commitment 
documents are service numbered.  Obligation documents, disbursing, travel, and pay 
forms are Department of Defense or Standard Forms.  The Army processes varies from 
these process flow charts only by the system used, where, and who processes the 
financial documentation.  There is a significant potential to increase interoperability and 
jointness into financial management. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a world leader, the US military establishment must function as an 
integrated efficient team.96 
A. OVERVIEW 
The following recommendations reflect the changing environment and needed 
capabilities of the future defense force.  Some are “low hanging fruit” that can be easily 
implemented by policy changes.  Other recommendations will require further study and 
more in-depth analysis, which is beyond the scope of this project.  Our recommendations 
cover the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical planning levels of an organization, and 
leadership. 
B.  STRATEGIC 
1. Mobilization 
This analysis is based on historical fact.  Mobilization planning was a huge failure 
during World War II.  Chapter II highlighted many of the pay problems that the reserve 
component faced and it continues to be a problem today.  When the President decides to 
mobilize forces for a contingency, planners and leaders at the Department and Service 
levels must realize that personnel and finance members must be mobilized prior to any 
mass mobilization.  This will allow for proper identification of mobilized personnel as 
well as establishing and paying the mobilized individuals properly.  Financial 
Management leadership must make this a priority to be incorporated in the War 
Mobilization Plan as well as in Operational Plans. 
Once finance members have been mobilized and completed initial mobilization of 
their unit’s forces, these members can then be used to augment key positions throughout 
the finance command structure.  Locating these members at centralized processing 
centers, service and major command level crisis action teams, can and will alleviate and 




assist mobilized personnel.  The successful implementations of these recommendations 
were proved by ACC and AMC as discussed in Chapter II.  This will complete the first 
step in planning. 
2. Unity of Command and Effort 
Joint Publication 5-0 states that sound command has three things:  Unity of 
Command, Unity of Effort and Centralized Planning.  Unity of Command is essential for 
employment of forces to maximize combat effectiveness.  If this cannot be achieved, 
unity of effort is a must.  Unity of Effort is necessary for the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the task.  The Army finance structure inhibits this goal.  Their stated presentation of 
forces differs from the concept of operations.  According to the field manual, FINCOM is 
the central theater level command and control.  The FINCOM is not the central hub of 
financial management. 
In contrast to the Army, the United States Air Force merged its resource 
management and finance career fields over a decade ago.  One comptroller is the 
commander of budget/resource management and finance personnel.  The is consistent 
with our presentation of forces and concept of operation.  The Department of the Army 
should do the same.  This is benchmarked with the corporate structure of finance, which 
consists of a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) with a controller (resource management) and 
treasurer (finance) reporting to the CFO.97     
Morgan Denny concluded in his paper that the Finance Corps must merge with 
the resource management function to form a Comptroller Corps.98  The lack of unity of 
command was evident when trying to gather information for the project from one 
resource manager when he complained, “I’m not no damn finance guy.”99  One of the 
benefits of merging the career fields will help break the “us vs. them” mentality.  
Merging the career field will also give individuals breadth and depth of all financial 
management related activities.  If Unity of Command cannot be achieved, we must at 
least achieve Unity of Effort. 
Unity of Effort can be achieved by designating the Army Service Component 
command with overall comptroller and financial management duties.  This will enable 
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the Service Component Commander to establish pay and policy procedures throughout 
his assigned area of responsibility through the G-1.  This will prevent the organizational 
problems that happened during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM as discussed in 
Chapter II.  Major Murch cites, in his Army Command and Staff College thesis, Hugh 
Tent’s position that the problems during “OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and 
DESERT STORM were a direct result of command and control problems caused by the 
lack of a proper command and control structure.”100  The Service Component Commander 
is ultimately responsible to his service for his combatant commander’s area of operation.  
Whether in theater or not, assigned as Combined Forces Land Component Commander or 
just the Army Component Commander, he retains administrative control of all Army 
Forces in the theater.  This will align concept of operations as well as provide a focal 
point for coordination between the two services.  Joint Publication 1 states, “Unity of 
effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key 
considerations in joint operations.”101 
3. Benchmark Finance Command and Theater Finance Cell 
An Air Force visionary on combat comptroller operations, Lt Col. Matt Swanson, 
requested the establishment of a permanent comptroller contingency organization and an 
expeditionary contingency organization.102  The permanent organization would have been 
the central point for contingency operations.  It would contain all the corporate 
knowledge of how to execute contingency operations and develop new innovative 
processes.  Since the request, the permanent comptroller contingency organization was 
reduced to adding a few additional people in warplanning.  The expeditionary 
contingency organization was dropped completely because of the establishment of the 
Air Force Call Center (AFCC). 
The Air Force Call Center is precisely the reason why the Air Force needs to 
establish an expeditionary contingency organization.  This would be an Air Force 
adaptation of the Army’s Theater Finance Command that was discussed in Chapter III.  
The AFCC will be manned with approximately 650 Air Force Financial Management 
personnel with experience in military pay, travel pay and disbursing experience.103  Each 
of the 10 AEFs will posture 65 finance personnel into XFFA1, XFFA2 and XFFAE 
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UTCs in accordance with posturing guidance.  Each 65-man team can train and deploy 
together and just one AEF would be needed to maintain current operations.  This 
recommendation serves two purposes.  The first is that it provides a central place from 
which to deploy troops.  They will work, train and deploy together.  Second, if additional 
manpower is cut due to force shaping, this will provide strong evidence of the wartime 
mission essential to financial management.  Additional benefits could be gained by 
adding a command and control element. 
Any additional XFFA3 or XFFA4 (officers), XFFAF (enlisted budget), XFFA7 
(accounting personnel with an Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) of 6F051), and XFFA2 
(accounting personnel with an AFSC of 6F071 or greater) requirements will be supported 
by base-level comptroller personnel.104  The Air Force could add five command and 
control teams consisting of one each Comptroller, Budget Officer and a senior enlisted 
person at the call center. Each command section would lead a pair of AEFs.  These 
individual would command and control the same personnel in theater as they do at home.  
This will enable a complete deployable theater finance cell to deploy at a moments notice 
to establish several bases without interruption to a component commander’s homestation 
staff.  This would also eliminate the need to have a permanent, forward presence in 
theater because a command and control element would deploy with their airmen.     
In addition to creating a theater finance cell, the Air Force must create a 
permanent contingency organization.  The command and control elements above can 
function as this organization.  Not all will deploy at any one time allowing for continuity.  
The Army has already established such an organization.   
The U.S. Army Financial Command’s mission and functions are to 
develop and implement plans to review, oversee, and improve the Army’s 
tactical finance and accounting network; establish finance and accounting 
plans, systems, and operations to include filed level in conjunction with 
DFAS; develop contingency plans and procedures for finance and 
accounting services in war zones; monitor and report the performance of 
the U.S. Army Finance Command.105 
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This organization can be benchmarked for the Air Force.  The AFCC will have a 
consistent working relationship with the Air Force Accounting and Finance office and all 
other organizations that would be required to establish such an organization.  This will 
amplify the Joint Publication 5-0 requirement for common doctrine.   
C. OPERATIONAL 
1. One Installation, One Commander 
This analysis builds on the concept of Unity of Command.  It also uses DoD’s 
finite resources more effectively and efficiently as directed by the National Military 
Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review.  Once a combatant commander has made the 
decision to establish a base, he must select a service to be lead agency.  It is almost 
impossible for any one service to be lead agency for an entire theater.  Highlighted in 
Chapter II is the fact that many locations have duplicative support personnel, which 
increases the logistical support required to sustain the deployed forces.  Army and Air 
Force financial management personnel already use the same military pay system and 
funding is provided by Congress through the Supplemental process so it should not 
matter who pays for what.  The service selected to be the lead agency for that installation 
must fund all support activities and provide service to all members assigned to the 
installation.  A historical precedent was established during the planning and occupation 
of Angaur and Peleliu during World War II.  The Army and Army Air Forces working 
together decided to use Air Forces finance units to pay both air and ground forces.106  
Additional synergy and savings could be found by eliminating other duplicate support 
personnel.  This will increase the “tooth to tail ratio.”   
2. Centralized Processing 
The National Defense Strategy of 2004 states that Department of Defense should 
become a network centric force.  “A network centric force can increase efficiency and 
effectiveness in business processes by giving all users access to the latest, most relevant, 
most accurate information.  It also enables “reach-back” by more effectively employing 
people and capabilities without deploying them forward.”107  Some of the key attributes 
described are “reach-back” capabilities—support capabilities that are available remotely 
rather than in forward theaters.  The future force must leverage reach-back capabilities 
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and reduce the footprint abroad to strengthen our military effectiveness.108  Central 
Processing is essential to the National Defense Strategy and is based on historical proof 
during World War II, Korea, Vietnam, OEF, and OIF. 
After review of several Army Command and Staff College and Army War 
College theses, the Army must revisit their findings and adopt a centralized finance and 
resource management process.  This builds on the Unity of Command and Unity of Effort 
previously discussed.  “In Pacific operations several commands faced funding problems.  
After two years, they found it impractical to have individual disbursing officers receive 
funds directly from the Treasury, so they consolidated funding on a theater basis.”109  
During Vietnam, Military Advisory Command, Vietnam had central control over all 
aspects of financial and resource management.110  Major Murch emphasized that too 
many players were involved in and out of the theater and one central link was needed.111 
The Air Force Centralized Processing Site is a benchmark to be used. 
CENTAF was nominated and won the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
for Financial Management Awards Program Fiscal Year 2005.  They made the Air Force 
Transformation initiative, the Central Processing Site, a reality.112  In addition to meeting 
the unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution 
tenants, there are hard facts to support this concept of operation: 
1. Improved payment processing timeliness from 90+ days to less then 7. 
2. Allows for deployed locations to implement line item accounting for 
deployed sites while maintaining a smaller footprint.  Instrumental when 
defending expenditures to congress. 
3. Improved Obligation Rates by 77%.  Also, a must have when defending 
expenditures to Congress. 
4. Reduced paperwork by utilizing electronic storage of deployed 
documents. 
CENTAF’s concept of operation defines “reach-back” support and standardized 
accounting and disbursing operations.113  Operating from cyberspace allows fewer forces 
to be on the ground and provides DoD forces with operational freedom of action.114  The 
Air Force Audit Agency found no material weaknesses with sufficient documentation, 
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handling, separation of duties, and processing of financial documents at the CPS. 115  It 
improves capabilities, uses “reach back” support and operates from cyberspace. 
D. TACTICAL 
1. Manual Operations 
Joint Forces will require expeditionary capabilities with highly mobile forces 
skilled in flexible, adapting planning and decentralized execution even when operating 
from widely dispersed locations.116  Manual operations allow finance personnel to be 
anywhere in the world on a moments notice securing basing rights, purchasing supplies, 
and conducting other activities.  Financial Management personnel train to use manual 
processing.  Manual operations are necessary when communication links are not 
available.  This is a necessary manual skill that is quickly eroding because of automation. 
In Chapter II, we discussed paying agents losing their abilities to conduct manual 
transactions.  CENTAF also points out that even with automation, “Most of the 
comptroller operations within Iraq require paying agents to perform a significant cash and 
carry business to support the warfighter.”117  Manual operations guarantee a critical 
warfighting capability is maintained.  It eliminates the need for service unique systems 
and, most importantly, it allows for increased interoperability between the Air Force and 
Army. 
Service commitment documents and systems are unique; how to manage 
commitment document are not.  Interoperability, which enables joint and combined 
operations, is a key element in all DoD operational and systems architectures.118  Manual 
operations allow increased interoperability and jointness.  With manual operations an Air 
Force paying agent can be substituted for an Army paying agent.  Military pay 
technicians could also substitute for each other.  Appendix C has processes that are 
similar for the Air Force and Army.  They are: 
1. Accommodation/Reverse Exchange  
2. Check Cashing 
3. Collection Process 
4. Daily Balancing 
5. Dishonored Check Process 
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6. LDA Reconciliation 
7. Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (Incoming and Outgoing) 
8. Payment Process 
9. Turn-ins 
10. Turnover Processes 
11. U.S. Savings Deposit Plan 
When establishing many of the individual augmentee positions, Air Force 
personnel would complain about using Army systems.119  Eliminating service unique 
systems allows for greater integration.  In addition, finance personnel will not need 
special passwords or training for unique accounting and disbursing systems.  All 
documentation can be processed with “reach back” capabilities through a central 
processing site enabled by centralized control and decentralized execution.   The 
centralized site can be augmented by contractor support or reserve forces to meet the 
needs of an expanding area of operations. 
2. Modularity 
The strategic principles of decisiveness require tailored packages of joint 
capabilities designed to achieve specific effects and accomplish objectives.120  Major 
Murch cites findings by Major Dennis Fields that the modular structure of detachments 
was a perfect solution for deployment needs.  Finance Detachments are the lowest 
deployable capability but the Army does not typically deploy using finance detachments 
as a building block.  As explained in Chapter III, Army finance units are based on forces 
and echelons not capabilities.  The 2001 QDR states that the new defense strategy is 
based on a “capabilities-based” approach to defense.  Army capabilities must become 
capabilities-based and modular.  Deployable Army finance units must be stated in 
capabilities not echelons.  Finance capabilities include, accounting, military pay, 
disbursing, resource management and others.  
The Air Force Financial Management Unit Type Codes are perfect examples of 
capabilities-based deployable assets.  They begin at the lowest level possible with single 




Leadership was the most prominent problem in WWII.  Highlighted throughout 
this project are leadership failures, within and outside of the financial management career 
field.  Effective leadership must clearly communicate requirements in order to achieve 
and improve on our current financial management processes. 
Previous recommendations focus on improving interoperability, jointness and 
Unity of Command.  None of this can be done without leadership focus throughout the 
chain of command.  Leadership is quintessential for interoperability among Services, 
which requires greater coordination and collaboration.”121  While reviewing research 
material, conducting personal interviews, and from personal experience, it is apparent 
that financial management leadership did not fully communicate with each other within 
their service, between services, and with combatant commanders.  Leadership must work 
together to establish the best plan and use of resources.  Operational commanders also 
must recognize that resources must be used effectively and efficiently. 
Leadership outside of financial management must be involved.  Operational 
leadership must not place undue pressure on finance personnel to purchase items that are 
legal and improves the morale and welfare of the troop but may not be viewed by 
Congress and the public as prudent.  Sumo suits and cappuccino machines are just a few 
examples.  One deployed commander wanted to plant trees along the road on base and 
predictably, the deployed comptroller refused because of the perception of waste.  The 
comptroller was moved to another deployed location.122  Leadership must take an active 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The planning recommendations in the areas of Mobilization, Unity of Effort, One 
Installation, One Commander, Manual Operations, and Modularity are simple fixes.  
Many of them can be implemented with only simple planning.  This can be done prior to 
any contingency.  It starts with the President making the decision to mobilize forces.  
Proper planning and processing can be established prior to the actual decision to 
mobilize.  Combatant commanders develop their operational plans, when doing so they 
establish a lead service for each location.  If there is an air wing at the installation, the Air 
Force should have command.  Financial Management personnel already are taught the 
manual process.  The only change to the concept of operation is the central site versus 
processing in theater.  Reducing the overseas requirement also reduces the sustainment 
requirement.  The Army has capabilities within the Finance Detachment.  These 
capabilities must be stated and used.  Army deployment capabilities do not need to be 
associated with echelons.  Although these recommendations are simple, they still require 
leadership at every level. 
The recommendations in the areas of Unity of Command, Benchmark Finance 
Command and Theater Finance Cell, Central Processing, will require additional research 
and review.  Unity of Command will require the Army to reevaluate whether a customer 
or functional focus is best.  A functional focus would be a complete paradigm shift for 
the Army.  The Air Force reviewed and “shot down” the Finance Command and Theater 
Finance Cell.  However, they are currently planning the Air Force Call Center.  During 
this review, they can reenergize the debate on whether to move forward with the Finance 
Command and Theater Finance Cell.  Central Processing will be a different mindset for 
Army commanders.  They will no longer bring their own agents.  The agents will report 
back to a central site.  They will also get all funding, policy, disbursing, and accounting 
support from the Central Processing Site. Our project provided a starting point for future 
work and analysis on these recommendations. 
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Future research in the areas of Unity of Command and the Finance Command and 
Theater Finance Cell should also be conducted.  Our Unity of Command 
recommendation is based on Joint Publication 5-0 and the current Air Force finance 
career field.  As previously stated, an Army War College student in 1992, recommended 
merging the Army Financial Management and Resource Management career fields into a 
Comptroller Corps.  Updating Morgan Denny’s thesis would be a start for future studies.  
Another expansion of study on Unity of Command, could be to research why the Air 
Force made the decision to merge based on functionality.  This research could further 
justify our recommendations and develop additional recommendations.  An analysis of 
the Chief Financial Officer organization in the corporate sector could provide additional 
information on functional structure.  This would compare best business practices and 
incorporate these findings into additional defense reform initiatives.  Additional research 
would also benefit the Finance Command and Theater Finance Cell recommendations. 
Recommendations in the Finance Command and Theater Finance Cell require 
further review and additional research by the Air Force.  These are needed organizations.  
A starting point would be to verify that Army Finance Command’s mission and functions 
are stated correctly in their field manual.  Identifying their manpower requirements, 
working relationships with other organizations and workload would guide future 
recommendations.  A detailed review of Air Force responsibilities, roles, relationships, 
and missions at deployed sites, warfighting headquarters, major commands, Air Force 
Accounting and Finance Office, DFAS, and SAF/FMP will highlight overlaps and gaps 
in capabilities.  The Finance Command and Theater Finance Cell are extremely important 
concepts for overall planning and execution of contingencies.  The Air Force should not 
discard these concepts without careful review and analysis.  
These recommendations will support the preparation of the approved concept of 
operations or action for implementation in any crisis.  They will facilitate the 
determination of support requirements or combat service support function within the 
financial management career field to include resource management, budget, and financial 
services.123  Financial Management in its entirety will become increasingly more 
important because “military post-conflict operations will integrate conflict termination 
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objectives with diplomatic economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement and 
information efforts.  Joint forces will, where appropriate, synchronize and coordinate 
their operations and activities with international partners and non-Governmental 
organizations.”124  The Department of Defense financial management community can not 
afford to make the same mistakes we have made in the past.  Although we have made 
progress, we must continue to review lessons learned, analyze the facts, and implement 


























DCAPES: Manpower Force Element Listing with MISCAP 
 
UTC: XFFA1            Title: CMP CASHIER/PAYING AGENT                 
Registration Change Date: 13-FEB-2004 
 
Status: Standard      Responsible Command: AET  DEPID: P   ULC: ELE       
Manpower Change Date: 15-JAN-2004 
 
Authorized Total:    1 Enlisted 
 
UNCLASSIFIED    Mission Capability Statement MISCAP Change Date: 10-May-05 
 
ACCOUNT FOR FUNDS DISBURSED AND ON-HAND, MAINTAIN 
ACCOUNTING BALANCES, MAKE MANUAL VENDOR PAYMENTS IN CASH, 
MAKE OTHER CASH PAYMENTS AS REQUIRED, CASH PERSONAL CHECKS, 
MAKE ACCOMMODATION AND REVERSE ACCOMMODATION EXCHANGES,                
DETERMINE AND CERTIFY FUND AVAILABILITY, DETERMINE FUNDING 
PROPRIETY IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROPRIATION LAW, SAFEGUARD 
FUNDS, AND RECEIVE AND MAINTAIN FUNDING AUTHORITIES.  USE 
REACHBACK CAPABILITY FOR ENTITLEMENTS INQUIRIES.  PROVIDE 
TECHNICAL CAPABILITY TO AUGMENT A COMPTROLLER OR WITH 
DISB/PAYING AGENT.  DEPLOY THIS UTC WHEN SUPPORTING FORCE 
MODULE AND CONTRACTING UTCS. USE WITH UTC XFFAG TO PROVIDE 
RECEPTION/BEDDOWN AT BAREBASE LOCATIONS.  AFSC AUTH TO CARRY 
9MM.  NO DOWNWARD SUBSTITUTION AUTHORIZED, MAY SUB 6F071.  
OFFICIAL PASSPORT REQUIRED. MANPOWER SIZING GUIDELINES AND 
CONOPS ARE IN ANNEX N, WMP-1. LAST               REVIEW: MAY 05. 
 
 
                                          MANPOWER DETAIL 
FAC     FAC CODE TITLE                                         TOTAL                               
1510    ACCT FIN OPN                                                   1 
 
POSITION TITLE                   AFSC          QUANTITY     
FIN MGMT&CMPTLR JNMN         6F051                    1             
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UTC: XFFA2            Title: CMP PAYING/DISBURSING AGENT               
Registration Change Date: 13-FEB-2004 
 
Status: Standard      Responsible Command: AET  DEPID: P   ULC: ELE       
Manpower Change Date: 15-JAN-2004 
 
Authorized Total:    1 Enlisted 
 
UNCLASSIFIED    Mission Capability Statement      MISCAP Change Date: 22-APR-05 
 
ACCOUNT FOR FUNDS DISBURSED AND ON-HAND, MAINTAIN 
ACCOUNTING BALANCES, ESTABLISH LIMITED DEPOSITORY ACCOUNT 
(LDA), MAKE MANUAL VENDOR PAYMENTS VIA CASH OR LDA, CASH 
PERSONAL CHECKS AND MAKE ACCOMMODATION/REVERSE 
ACCOMMODATION EXCHANGES, DETERMINE/CERTIFY FUND 
AVAILABILITY, DETERMINE FUNDING PROPRIETY IAW APPROPRIATION 
LAW, SAFEGUARD FUNDS, RECEIVE/MAINTAIN FUNDING AUTHORITIES,                
PROVIDE IMPREST FUND SUPPORT, ANALYZE/RESPOND TO ENTITLEMENTS 
INQUIRIES, DETERMINE FUNDING PROPRIETY IN SUPPORT AGREEMENTS 
WITH US/FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ACCOUNT FOR 
MONETARY PAYMENTS/REMITTANCES OF AVAILABLE APPROPRIATIONS. 
DEPLOY THIS UTC WHEN SUPPORTING FORCE MODULE AND 
W/CONTRACTING UTCS. USE W/UTC XFFAG TO PROVIDE 
RECEPTION/BEDDOWN AT BAREBASE LOCATIONS. AFSC AUTHORIZED TO 
CARRY 9MM.  NO DOWNWARD SUBSTITUTION AUTHORIZED (ARC MAY 
SUB 6F091/6F000). OFFICIAL PASSPORT REQUIRED. MANPOWER SIZING 




                                          MANPOWER DETAIL 
FAC     FAC CODE TITLE                                         TOTAL   
1500    COMPTROLLER                                              1 
 
POSITION TITLE                      AFSC    QUANTITY   
FIN MGMT&CMPTLR CFMN             6F071                      1                                     
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UTC: XFFA3            Title: CMP COMPTROLLER                           
Registration Change Date: 13-FEB-2004 
 
Status: Standard      Responsible Command: AET  DEPID: P   ULC: ELE       
Manpower Change Date: 15-JAN-2004 
 
Authorized Total:    1 Officer 
 
UNCLASSIFIED    Mission Capability Statement      MISCAP Change Date: 22-APR-05 
 
CAPABILITY TO ADMINISTER COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES TO INCLUDE 
FINANCIAL ADVICE TO THE COMMANDER ON ALL FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT ISSUES, PROVIDE BUDGET AND FINANCIAL SERVICES 
OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES, ASSESS PROGRAM AND PROGRESS ANALYSIS 
AT ANY TYPE OPERATING LOCATION, DETERMINE FUNDING PROPRIETY, 
EXECUTE OPERATING BUDGETS, DEVELOP, MAINTAIN AND DISTRIBUTE 
FINPLANS, DETERMINE FUNDING PROPRIETY IN SUPPORT AGREEMENTS 
WITH US/FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ACCOUNT FOR 
MONETARY PAYMENTS/REMITTANCES OF AVAILABLE APPROPRIATIONS. 
DETERMINE PROPER USE OF ORF FUNDS. PROVIDE NAF SUPPORT AND 
OVERSIGHT. USE THIS UTC FOR FORCE MODULE FOR 
BEDDOWN/BAREBASE LOCATIONS. AUTHORIZED AFSC SUBSTITUTION OF 
65F3, 65W3, or 65W4.  NO DOWNWARD GRADE SUBSTITUTION AUTHORIZED. 
UPWARD GRADE SUBSTITUTION AUTHORIZED.  SUBSTITUTION OF MBR IN 
GRADE 0-6 AUTHORIZED UPON APPROVAL OF SUPPORTED COMMAND.             
MANPOWER SIZING GUIDELINES AND CONOPS ARE IN ANNEX N, WMP-1.                 
LAST REVIEW: MAY 05. 
 
MANPOWER DETAIL 
FAC     FAC CODE TITLE                                         TOTAL 
1500    COMPTROLLER                                              1 
 
POSITION TITLE                  AFSC    GRADE  QUANTITY      
FINANCIAL MGMT             065F4         04             1                     
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UTC: XFFA4            Title: CMP FINANCIAL MGMT OFFICER              
Registration Change Date: 13-FEB-2004 
 
 Status: Standard      Responsible Command: AET  DEPID: P   ULC: ELE     Manpower 
Change Date: 15-JAN-2004 
 
Authorized Total:    1 Officers 
 
UNCLASSIFIED    Mission Capability Statement  MISCAP Change Date: 22-APR-2005 
 
CAPABILITY TO IMPLEMENT AND MANAGE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
FUNCTIONS, PROVIDE FINANCIAL ADVICE TO THE COMMANDER ON ALL 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ISSUES, DEVELOP BUDGET ESTIMATES, 
ADMINISTER AND EXECUTE OPERATING BUDGETS, SERVE AS FOCAL 
POINT FOR BUDGET MATTERS PERTAINING TO FINANCIAL MGMT AT ANY 
TYPE OF OPERATING LOCATION, DETERMINE FUNDING PROPRIETY IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH APPROPRIATION LAW, DEVELOP, MAINTAIN AND 
DISTRIBUTE FINPLANS, RECEIVE AND MAINTAIN FUNDING AUTHORITIES, 
DETERMINE PROPER USE OF ORF FUNDS. MAY ACT AS COMPTROLLER IN 
LOCATIONS WITHOUT XFFA3. DETERMINE FUNDING PROPRIETY IN 
SUPPORT AGREEMENTS WITH US/FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND 
ACCOUNT FOR MONETARY PAYMENTS/REMITTANCES OF AVAILABLE 
APPROPRIATIONS.  PROVIDE NAF OVERSIGHT.  AUTHORIZED AFSC SUB IS 
065F4, 065W3, OR 065W4. MANPOWER SIZING GUIDELINES AND CONOPS ARE 
IN ANNEX N, WMP-1.   
MANPOWER DETAIL 
FAC     FAC CODE TITLE                                         TOTAL                            
1530    BUDGET STAFF                                             1 
 
POSITION TITLE                   AFSC   GRADE QUANTITY  
FINANCIAL MGMT                        065F3         03          1 
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UTC: XFFA7            Title: CMP ACCOUNTING TECHNICIAN                Registration 
Change Date: 13-FEB-2004 
 
 Status: Standard      Responsible Command: AET  DEPID: P   ULC: ELE       
Manpower Change Date: 10-JUN-2003 
 
Authorized Total:    1 Enlisted 
 
UNCLASSIFIED    Mission Capability Statement  MISCAP Change Date: 22-APR-2005 
 
ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN FINANCIAL RECORDS AND FILES, PREPARE 
VENDOR PAYMENTS, RECEIVE AND MANUALLY MAINTAIN FUNDING 
AUTHORIZATIONS, DETERMINE FUNDING PROPRIETY IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH APPROPRIATION LAW, DETERMINE PROPER USE OF ORF FUNDS, 
DETERMINE FUND STATUS/AVAILABILITY AND PROPER USE OF LINES OF 
ACCOUNTING, PREPARE VOUCHERS, COLLECT, PREPARE, REVIEW AND 
ANALYZE REPORT DATA, MAINTAIN ACCOUNTING BALANCES, USE 
AUTOMATED PAYMENT SYSTEMS IF AVAILABLE OR MANUALLY              
PREPARE PAYMENTS, ACCOUNT FOR SUPPORT PROVIDED BY HOST 
NATION OR COALITION  PARTNERS, AND ACCOUNT FOR COALITION 
CONTRIBUTIONS OR REMITTANCES.  MAY BE USED TO AUGMENT OTHER 
COMPTROLLER UTCS.  AFSC AUTH TO CARRY 9MM.  MAY REQUIRE               
LOGISTICS UTC XFFAG WHEN DEPLOYING TO A COB, BARE BASE OR 
LIMITED BASE TYPE LOCATION. NO DOWNWARD SUBSTITUTION 
AUTHORIZED.  AUTHORIZED AFSC SUBSTITUTION OF  6F071.  MANPOWER 
SIZING GUIDELINES AND CONOPS ARE IN ANNEX N, WMP-1.  
 
                                          MANPOWER DETAIL 
FAC     FAC CODE TITLE                                         TOTAL                
1510    ACCT FIN OPN                                                    1 
 
POSITION TITLE                   AFSC    QUANTITY   
FIN MGMT&CMPTLR JNMN         6F051                       1 
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UTC: XFFAC            Title: CMP LEAD INDEPENDENT TEAM                 
Registration Change Date: 13-FEB-2004 
 
 Status: Standard      Responsible Command: AET  DEPID: P   ULC: TM        
Manpower Change Date: 15-JAN-2004 
 
Authorized Total: 5 Enlisted 
 
UNCLASSIFIED    Mission Capability Statement  MISCAP Change Date: 22-APR-2005 
 
PROVIDES ONE 6F091 SUPERINTENDENT, ONE 5-LVL CASHIER/PAYING 
AGENT, ONE 7-LVL PAYING/DISBURSING AGENT, ONE 5-LVL ACCOUNTING 
TECHNICIAN, AND ONE 7-LVL CUSTOMER SERVICE TECHNICIAN WITH 
CAPABILITY TO ESTABLISH INDEPENDENT DISB/PAYING AGENT OFFICE.   
WHEN BUDGET OPERATIONS OR FINANCIAL ANALYSIS CAPABILITY IS 
NEEDED DEPLOY UTC XFFAF OR XFFA4 WITH THIS TEAM. USE THIS UTC 
DURING FORCE MODULE TO SUPPORT SUSTAINMENT OF FORCES.  DEPLOY 
WITH LOGISTICS DETAIL UTC XFFAG WHEN DEPLOYING TO A COB, 
BAREBASE OR LIMITED BASE TYPE LOCATION.  AFSC 6F091/6F071 IS           
AUTHORIZED TO CARRY 9MM.  NO DOWNWARD SUBSTITUTION 
AUTHORIZED ON 6F051, 6F051 MAY BE FILLED BY 6F071.  6F071 MAY BE 
FILLED BY 6F091. NO DOWNWARD SUBSTITUTION ON 6F091, 6F091 MAY BE 
FILLED WITH 6F000. OFFICIAL PASSPORT REQUIRED FOR 6F091 AND 6F071 
MANPOWER SIZING GUIDELINES AND CONOPS ARE IN ANNEX N, WMP-1.    
 
 
                                          MANPOWER DETAIL 
FAC     FAC CODE TITLE  TOTAL                                  
1510    ACCT FIN OPN                            5 
 
POSITION TITLE                    AFSC    QUANTITY   
FIN MGMT&CMPTLR JNMN            6F051                       2 
FIN MGMT&CMPTLR CFMN           6F071                       2 
FIN MGMT&CMPTLR SUPT            6F091                       1                                     
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UTC: XFFAD            Title: CMP DISBURSING TEAM                      
Registration Change Date: 13-FEB-2004 
 
Status: Standard      Responsible Command: AET  DEPID: P   ULC: TM       
Manpower Change Date: 10-JUN-2003 
 
Authorized Total:    3 Enlisted 
 
UNCLASSIFIED    Mission Capability Statement  MISCAP Change Date: 22-APR-2005 
 
PROVIDES ONE 5-LVL CASHIER/PAYING AGENT, ONE 7-LVL 
PAYING/DISBURSING AGENT, AND ONE 5-LVL ACCOUNTING TECHNICIAN 
WITH CAPABILITY TO ESTABLISH PAYING OR DISBURSING AGENT OFFICE 
AND PROVIDE FINANCIAL SERVICES AND ACCOUNTING FUNCTIONS AT 
ANY TYPE OF OPERATING LOCATION.  WHEN BUDGET OPERATIONS OR 
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS CAPABILITY IS NEEDED DEPLOY UTC XFFAF WITH 
THIS TEAM.  USE THIS UTC DURING FORCE MODULE TO SUPPORT 
SUSTAINMENT OF FORCES.  MAY REQUIRE LOGISTICS UTC XFFAG WHEN             
DEPLOYING TO A COB, BARE BASE, OR LIMITED BASE TYPE LOCATION.  
AFSC 6F071 AUTHORIZED TO CARRY 9MM. NO DOWNWARD SUBSTITUTION 
AUTHORIZED.  6F071 MAY SUBSTITUTED FOR 6F051.  MANPOWER SIZING 
GUIDELINES AND CONOPS GUIDANCE ARE IN  ANNEX N, WMP-1.  
 
                                          MANPOWER DETAIL 
FAC     FAC CODE TITLE                                         TOTAL                         
1500    COMPTROLLER                                              1 
 
POSITION TITLE                   AFSC   QUANTITY   
FIN MGMT&CMPTLR CFMN         6F071              1                                     
ACCT FIN OPN   6F051              1 
FIN MGMT&CMPTLR JNMN         6F051        1 
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UTC: XFFAE            Title: CMP CUSTOMER SVS TECH 
Registration Change Date: 13-FEB-2004 
 
Status: Standard      Responsible Command: AET  DEPID: P   ULC: TM       
Manpower Change Date: 15-JAN-2004 
 
Authorized Total:    1 Enlisted 
 
UNCLASSIFIED    Mission Capability Statement MISCAP Change Date: 10-MAY-2005 
 
PROVIDE ALL FACETS OF MILITARY AND TRAVEL PAY FINANCIAL 
SERVICES AT ANY TYPE OF OPERATING LOCATION, TO INCLUDE AIR 
RESERVE COMPONENT SUPPORT, PROCESS MILITARY PAY AND TRAVEL 
TRANSACTIONS VIA AUTOMATED SYSTEMS IF AVAILABLE, ANALYZE AND              
RESPOND TO MILITARY PAY AND TRAVEL INQUIRIES, PREPARE 
DISBURSEMENT AND COLLECTION VOUCHERS.  USE THIS UTC TO 
AUGMENT OTHER COMPTROLLER UTCS WHERE MORE THAN REACHBACK 
CUSTOMER SERVICE CAPABILITY IS REQUIRED.  USE THIS UTC DURING                
FORCE MODULE.  NO DOWNWARD SUBSTITUTION AUTHORIZED.  AFSC 
AUTHORIZED TO CARRY 9MM.  MANPOWER SIZING GUIDELINES AND 
CONOPS ARE IN ANNEX N, WMP-1.   
 
                                          MANPOWER DETAIL 
FAC     FAC CODE TITLE                                         TOTAL 
1500    COMPTROLLER                                                  1 
 
 POSITION TITLE                  AFSC   QUANTITY 
FIN MGMT&CMPTLR CFMN   6F071             1    
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UTC: XFFAF            Title: CMP BUDGET NCO                           
Registration Change Date: 13-FEB-2004 
 
Status: Standard      Responsible Command: AET  DEPID: P   ULC: TM       
Manpower Change Date: 10-JUN-2003 
 
Authorized Total:    1 Enlisted 
 
UNCLASSIFIED    Mission Capability Statement  MISCAP Change Date: 25-APR-2005 
 
DEVELOP BUDGET ESTIMATES, EXECUTE OPERATING BUDGETS AND 
SERVE AS FOCAL POINT FOR ALL BUDGET MATTERS PERTAINING TO 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AT ANY TYPE OF OPERATING LOCATION. 
DETERMINE FUND AVAILABILITY AND FUNDING PROPRIETY IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH APPROPRIATION LAW, RECEIVE AND MAINTAIN 
FUNDING DOCUMENTS, DETERMINE PROPER USE OF ORF FUNDS, 
ACCOUNT FOR REAL PROPERTY, DEVELOP, MAINTAIN AND DISTRIBUTE                
FINPLANS, PROCESS UPWARD ADJUSTMENTS, DETERMINE FUNDING 
PROPRIETY IN SUPPORT AGREEMENTS WITH US/FOREIGN GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES AND ACCOUNT FOR MONETARY PAYMENTS/REMITTANCES OF 
AVAILABLE APPROPRIATIONS. USE THIS UTC TO AUGMENT OTHER             
COMPTROLLER UTCS AND FOR FORCE MODULE FOR BEDDOWN/BAREBASE 
LOCATIONS. AUTHORIZED SUBSTITUTIONS ARE AFSC 6F051 OR 6F091.  
MANPOWER SIZING GUIDELINES AND CONOPS ARE IN ANNEX N, WMP-1.  
 
                                          MANPOWER DETAIL 
FAC     FAC CODE TITLE                                         TOTAL 
1530    BUDGET STAFF                                                  1 
 
 POSITION TITLE                   AFSC   QUANTITY 
FIN MGMT&CMPTLR CFMN    6F071              1 
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UTC - XFFAG0 TITLE-CMP COMPT TACTICAL LOGISTIC KIT  MEFPAK 
CMD - 0J    DEPID - E     ULC - ELE   CHANGE DATE -  04-OCT-00 
 
STRENGTH RETRIEVED - OFF 0       AMN 0       CIV 0       TOTAL 0 
 
MISSION CAPABILITIES STATEMENT  (UNCLASSIFIED) PROVIDES 
INITIAL BASIC COMPTROLLER-UNIQUE SUPPLIES, FORMS, PUBLICATIONS, 
AND OFFICE EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT DISBURSING/PAYING AGENT  
PERATIONS AT ANY TYPE OF NON-MOB OPERATING LOCATION.  DESIGNED 
TO SUPPORT UP TO 1,500 PERSONNEL FOR ABOUT 30 DAYS. THIS UTC 
SHOULD BE USED TO SUPPORT THE INITIAL RECEPTION AND BEDDOWN                    
OF FORCES DURING DELIBERATE PLANNING, CRISIS ACTION 
CONTINGENCIES, AND JCS/AF FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES.  LARGER 
OPERATING LOCATIONS MAY REQUIRE MULTIPLES OF THIS UTC. THIS UTC 
SHOULD BE DEPLOYED WITH UTC XFFAC AND OTHER UTCS AS REQUIRED. 
CONOPS GUIDANCE IS IN ANNEX N, WMP-1.  THIS UTC MAY BE TAILORED 





INSTRUCTIONS.  The purpose of this task list is to define the job tasks associated with each UTC in 
preparation for deployment. The supervisor, trainer and trainee will evaluate the trainee's knowledge 
from the UTC Task Lists. If there is an "X" in the block for a UTC task item, then it needs to be circled, 
trained and signed-off. These items should be circled on the Specialty Training Standard (STS ) as 
part of the trainee's job tasks.  Normal On The-Job (OJT) rules apply. Consult the 6F0XX CFETP and 
AFI 36-2201V3, On The Job Training Administration for details.  UTC tasks do not require a third party 
certification. 
1.  Tasks XFFA1 XFFA2 XFFA7 XFFAF XFFAE 
6F051 6F071 6F051 6F071 6F071 
















      
      
6. FEDERAL BUDGET SYSTEM TR: 
DODI 7045.7, and AFI 65-601 V3           
6.1 Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
System X  X 
6.2 Budget Process X   X 
7. APPROPRIATION LAW         TR: 
Principles of Federal Appropriation 
Law, Title 31 USC 1341, 1342, and 
1517, 
http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/fiscallaw 
          
7.1 Anti-Deficiency Act               TR: 
Title 31 USC 1341, 1342, 1344, and 
1511-17 
X X  X 
7.2 Food and Forage Act           TR: Title 41 
USC 11 X  X 
7.3 Bonafide Need                       TR: 31 USC 
1502(a) X X X 
7.4 Comptroller General Decisions X  X 
8. FINANCIAL PLANS                         
TR: AFI 65-601 V1 Ch 5, 7, and 10, 
V2 Ch 2-5, 7, and 9, AFI 65-603 Ch 1, 
DFAS-DE 7012.2R Ch 3, 5, and 10, 
DODFMR 7000.14R V 1, 2, 11, and 
14 
          
8.1.1 Flying Hour Program  X  
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8.1.2 Official Representation Funds X  X  
8.1.3 Travel/Transportation  X  
8.1.4.1 Utilities  X  
8.1.4.2 Communications  X  
8.1.4.3 Rents/Leases  X  
8.1.4.4 Real Property Maintenance (RPM)  X  
8.1.4.5 Miscellaneous Contract Services/Purchases Maintenance X  
8.1.5 Supplies and Equipment  X  
8.1.6 Non-Flying DLRs  X  
8.2.1 Exhibits  X 
8.2.2 Unfunded Requirements  X 
9. FUNDS DISTRIBUTION                    
TR: AFI 65-601 V1 Ch 5, V2 Ch 2-7, 
and 14 
          
9.1 Relationship of Direct and Reimbursment Funding, TOA and TAA X 
9.2 Interpret Funding Guidance   X 
9.3.2 Quarterly Phasing  X 
9.4.1 General Accounting and Finance System X 
9.5 Verify Target/Limitation Loads Agains Document X 
10. BUDGET EXECUTION 
TR: DoDI 4000.19; DFAS-DE 170-10; 
AFI 65-601 Vol 1, Chap 4-10, 15, 16, 
18; AFI 65-601 Vol 2, Chap 2; 
DoDFMR 7000.14-R Vols 1, 2, 11, 
14; DFAS-DE 7010.1-R and AFMAN 
65-604 
          
10.2. Determine Status of 
Funds/Reprogramming Actions X  X 
10.3. Track Reimbursements   X X X 
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10.9. Fiscal Year-End and Close-Out X X X 
10.10. Perform Budget Program Analysis  X 
11.4. Funds Certification 
TR: DoDFMR Vol 14; DFAS-DE 
Interim Guidance, Accounting for 
Commitments; AFI 65-601 V1;  
          
11.4.2. Determine Propriety of 
Funding  X X X X 
11.4.3. Determine Fund Availability  X X X X 
11.4.4. WinBAS Execution Reports  X 
11.4.5. Certify Fund Availability X X X X 
11.9.1. AF Form 9, Request for Purchase X X X 
11.9.2. AF Form 616, Fund Cite 
Authorization X X X X 
11.9.3. AF Form 4009,  Government Purchase 
Card Fund Cite Authorization X  X 
11.9.4. DD Form 448, Military Interdepartmental 
Purchase Request  X X X 
11.10.1. Contracts/Purchase Orders X X X 
11.10.2. Project Order X X X 
11.10.3. SF 44, Purchase Order - 
Invoice - Voucher  X X X X 
11.10.5. DD Form 448-2, Acceptance Military 
Interdepartmental Purchase Request  X X X  
11.10.6. Government Purchase Card Program 
TR: AFI 64-117 X  X  
11.10.8.4. Legal Claims  X   
11.10.8.6. Transportation Documents (TR, MTA, GBL) X   
11.11. Process Receiving Reports 
TR: DFAS-DE SOP 7300-8 Ch2.9; DFAS DE 
7077.7-M 
X X X  
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11.12. Process Invoices 
TR: DFAS-DE SOP 7300-8 Ch2.6; DFAS-DE 
7077.7-M 
X X   
11.13.1.1.  Cash Management  X X X   
11.13.2.1. Budget Rate X X X X  
11.13.2.2. Daily Exchange Rate X X X   
11.13.3. Prepare and Assemble 
Vouchers X X X  X 
11.13.4. Voucher Certification X X X   
11.13.5.  Prepare and Process 
Adjustment Vouchers X X X  X 
11.15.2. Process Collections X X  X 
11.17.1. Open Document List   X X  
11.18. Tri-Annual Review of Obligations 
TR: DFAS-DE 7220.4-G X X  
12. MILITARY PAY SYSTEM           
12.1. Interpret MMPA 
TR: DFAS-DE 7073.1-M  
Chap 5 
X   X 
12.2. Interpret LES 
TR: DFAS-DE 7073.1-M 
Chap 7 
X X   X 
12.3. Rejects/Management Notices 
TR: DFAS-DE 7073.1-M 
Chap 4 
X 
13. ENTITLEMENTS           
13.1. Compute Basic Pay 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R  
Vol 7A Chap 2; DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 8 
X 
13.2.3. Compute and Process Hostile 
Fire and Imminent Danger 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R  
Vol 7A Chap 10; DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, 
Chap 13 
X X   X 
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13.2.5. Compute and Process 
Hardship Duty Pay 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R 
Vol 7A Chap 17; DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, 
Chap 18 
X X   X 
13.2.6. Incentive Pay 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R 
Vol 7A Chap 6,7,13; DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 21 
X 
13.2.8. Career Status Bonus 
TR: National Defense Authorization Act, Sections 641-644; Public Law 106-65, 5 Oct 
99; HQ USAF/DP Msg 302327Z MAR 01; MPFM 01-10, 10 Apr 01 
X 
14. ALLOWANCES           
14.1. Compute and Process BAS 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R  
Vol 7A, Chap 25; DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 25 
X 
14.2. Compute and Process BAH 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R 
Vol 7A, Chap 26; DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 26 
X 
14.3. Clothing 
TR: DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 33 X X   X 
14.4. Compute and Process FSA/ FSH 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R 
Vol 7A, Chap 27; DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 27 
X   X 
14.5. Compute and Process COLA 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R 
Vol 7A, Chap 28; DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 28 
X 
14.6. Compute and Process OHA 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R 
Vol 7A, Chap 28; DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 30 
X 
15. DUTY STATUS           
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15.2. Leave Entitlements 
TR: DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 44 X   X 
15.3. Determine Effect of TDY on Pay and 
Allowances 
TR: DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 45 
X   X 
16. DEDUCTIONS 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R  
Vol 7A; DFAS-DE 7073.1-M; DFAS-
DE 7073.2-M 
          
16.1. Compute and Process Taxes (FITW, FICA, Medicare and SITW) 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R  
Vol 7A, Chap 4; DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 56 
X 
16.3. Thrift Savings Plan 
TR: Summary of the Thrift Savings Plan for the Uniformed Services  X 
17. PROCESS ALLOTMENTS 
TR: DFAS-DE 7073.1-M  
Chap  41, 42, 43 
X 
18. INDEBTEDNESS           
18.1. Types 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R  
Vol 7A, Chap 70, 71, 72;  
DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 70, 71, 72 
X 
21. REENLISTMENTS  
TR: DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 53           
21.1. Principles      X 
21.2.  Compute Bonus    X 
21.3.  Compute Leave Settlement    X 
23.COMPUTE AND PROCESS 
MILITARY PAYMENTS 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R Vol 7A, 
Chap 32; DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 
35, 36, 54 
          
23.2. Partial  X   X 
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27. COMPUTE AND PROCESS 
COMBAT ZONE TAX EXCLUSION/  
QUALIFIED HAZARDOUS DUTY 
AREA 
TR: DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 13 
X X   X 
28. SAVINGS DEPOSIT PROGRAM 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R Vol 7A, Chap 51;  
DFAS-DE 7073.1-M, Chap 62 
X   X 
31. GUARD AND RESERVE 
COMPONENTS (PAY AND 
ALLOWANCES) 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R Vol 7A, 
Chap 57 & 58, DJMS-RC ADSM 
          
31.1. Statuses  X   X 
31.2. Interpret an MMPA X   X 
35. COMPUTE TEMPORARY DUTY 
TRAVEL-MILITARY AND CIVILIAN 
TR: JFTR Vol 1; JTR Vol 2; 
AFI 65-103 Vol 2 
          
35.1. Compute Leave and Allowable Travel 
Time 
TR: JFTR Vol 1, Chap 4; AFI 65-103 Vol 2, 
Chap 4 
X   X 
35.2.  Compute Travel and Transportation Options and Allowances 
TR: JFTR Vol 1, Chap 4; JTR Vol 2, Chap 4; AFI 65-103 Vol 2, Chap 3 X 
35.3. Compute Accrual Vouchers 
TR: AFI 65-103 Vol 2, Chap 9 X   X 
35.4. Compute Reimbursable Expenses 
TR: JFTR Vol 1, Chap 4; JTR Vol 2, Chap 4; AFI 
65-103 Vol 2, Chap 4 
X   X 
35.5.1. Compute Active Duty Training Vouchers X   X 
35.5.2. Compute Inactive Duty Training 
Vouchers X   X 
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36. COMPUTE VICINITY TRAVEL AND 
MISCELLANEOUS REIMBURSABLE 
EXPENSES 
TR: JFTR Vol 1, Chap 4; JTR Vol 2, Chap 4; AFI 
65-103 Vol 2, Chap 4, 11 
X   X 
37. OVERSEAS EMERGENCY LEAVE 
TR: JFTR Vol 1, Chap 7; AFI 65-103 Vol 2, 
Chap 11 
X   X 
43. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS  
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R 
Vol 5; AFI 10-213; AFPAM 
65-110 
          
43.1. Appointments and Duties of 
Agents 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R Vol 5, Chap 
2 
          
43.1.1. Disbursing Agents X    
43.1.2. Paying Agents X X    
43.1.3. Cashiers X X    
43.2. Safeguarding Funds, negotiable 
instruments, and vouchers  
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R Vol 5, Chap 
3; AFI 31-101, Chap 25 
X X    
43.3. Determine Sources of Funds 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R, Vol 5, Chap 
5 and 12 
X X    
43.4. Limited Depository Account 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R 
Vol 5 Chap 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 
X    
43.5. Accountability 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R 
Vol 5 Chap 19; AFPAM 
65-110 Chap 7 
X X    
43.6. Destruction of Funds 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R Vol 5, Chap 
18 
X X    
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46. MANAGEMENT AND 
SUPERVISION 
TR: AFMAN 36-2108;  
AFI 36-2201; AFI 36-2403;  
AFI 36-2503; AFI 36-2907; 
AFI 36-3208; AFP 36-2241; AFI 65-
202 
          
46.4.1. Establish Standards for Work 
Performance X    
46.4.3. Job Performance Feedback X    
46.6. Doubtful Claims 
TR: DoDFMR 7000.14-R 
Vol 10 Chap 3 
X   X 
46.9. Support Agreements X  X  
The following items require training and will be included in the 2004 STS. 
Instruct on myPay use 
TR: http://www.dfas.mil/mypay/ X X   X 
Manual AF Form 616 Balancing 
TR: DoDFMR Vol 4 X X X X X 
Safe Opening and Closing  
TR: User Guide; AFI 31-101, The AF 
Installation Security Program 
X X X X X 
Safe Combination Changing 
TR: User Guide; AFI 31-101, The AF 
Installation Security Program 
X X X X X 
COMBAT (Contingency Operations & 
Mobilization Basic Agent Tools) 
TR: https://web2.ssg.gunter.af. 
mil/combat/ 
X X X X X 
Site Survey 
TR: AFPAM 65-110 X X X X X 
Agent Turn-Ins 
TR: DoDFMR Vol 5; AFPAM 65-110 X X X X X 
Status of Funds Briefing 
TR: 
https://web2.ssg.gunter.af.mil/combat/
X X X X X 
Support Agreements for Coalition 
Forces 
TR: DoD Regulation 7000.14-R Vol 
11A, Ch 8; AFI 25-301 
X X X X X 
FM Role in the AEF Force Module 
Construct 
TR:  
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